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Theoretical	  legitimacy	  of	  ‘strategic	  management’	  has	  not	  yet	  been	  established.	  This	  exploratory	  
theoretical	  paper	  revisits	  the	  connection	  between	  entrepreneurship	  and	  strategy.	  Examining	  
data	  of	  decisions	  in	  two	  firms	  across	  their	  initial	  years,	  one	  of	  which	  sold	  to	  a	  larger	  buyer	  and	  
the	  other	  did	  not,	  this	  paper	  attempts	  to	  trace	  the	  firms’	  path	  in	  navigating	  the	  tension	  between	  
entrepreneurial	  exploration	  necessary	  for	  initial	  growth	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  strategic	  direction,	  on	  the	  
other,	  through	  building	  efficiency	  routines	  necessary	  for	  profitable	  exploitation.	  Preliminary	  results	  and	  




Strategy	  scholarship,	  Jerry	  Katz	  reminds	  us	  in	  prefacing	  Meyer	  and	  Heppard’s	  (2000)	  book,	  is	  the	  parent	  
of	  entrepreneurship	  as	  a	  field	  of	  study	  and	  that	  the	  child,	  having	  grown	  up,	  now	  informs	  the	  parent	  
field.	  This	  exploratory	  theoretical	  paper	  revisits	  the	  relationship	  between	  entrepreneurship	  and	  strategy	  
in	  order	  to	  understand	  the	  new	  field	  of	  ‘strategic	  entrepreneurship’	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  which	  has	  been	  
claimed	  but	  not	  yet	  established.	  To	  do	  so	  it	  examines	  empirical	  longitudinal	  data	  in	  two/three	  firms	  
during	  their	  initial	  growth	  phase.	  It	  is	  pertinent	  that	  start-­‐up	  and	  established	  businesses	  environments	  
respectively	  contextualise	  the	  entrepreneurship	  and	  strategy	  literatures.	  Opportunity	  formation	  
characterises	  entrepreneurial	  behaviour	  (Venkataraman,	  1997)	  in	  the	  context	  of	  ‘start-­‐up’	  exploration,	  
and	  dominant	  logic	  characterises	  strategic	  behaviour	  of	  firms	  (Prahalad	  &	  Bettis,	  1986)	  in	  the	  context	  of	  
exploiting	  efficiencies.	  How	  do	  the	  two	  meet	  in	  ‘strategic	  entrepreneurship’?	  
The	  emphasis	  in	  strategic	  management	  literature	  of	  the	  need	  to	  retain	  entrepreneurial	  exploration	  
aspects	  in	  large	  firms	  and	  in	  the	  entrepreneurship	  literature	  of	  developing	  strategic	  direction	  in	  
entrepreneurial	  firms	  are	  important	  for	  firm	  growth	  (Hitt,	  Ireland,	  Camp,	  &	  Sexton,	  2002;	  Ireland,	  Hitt,	  &	  
Sirmon,	  2003;	  Venkataraman	  &	  Sarasvathy,	  2001).	  However,	  the	  change	  from	  an	  entrepreneurial	  
character	  to	  a	  strategic	  character	  in	  the	  growth	  path	  of	  an	  entrepreneurial	  firm	  is	  yet	  to	  be	  properly	  
understood.	  This	  paper	  argues	  that	  this	  change	  defines	  a	  chasm	  in	  a	  firm’s	  development	  path,	  when	  the	  
firm	  learns	  to	  engage	  in	  exploration	  and	  introduce	  routines	  of	  efficiency	  for	  profitable	  exploitation.	  This	  
often	  may	  define	  and	  a	  fundamental	  ‘DNA	  change’	  the	  firm	  may	  need	  to	  undergo	  as	  it	  learns	  this.	  
	  Theoretical	  considerations	  and	  proposition	  building	  
Successful	  entrepreneurial	  firms	  in	  their	  growth	  path,	  crossing	  over	  from	  being	  fleet-­‐footed	  small	  
entities	  to	  larger	  entities	  with	  established	  organisational	  routines,	  undergo	  a	  trade-­‐off	  from	  opportunity	  
seeking	  to	  advantage	  seeking	  behaviour	  (Ireland	  et	  al.,	  2003).	  During	  this	  phase	  a	  lessening	  of	  the	  
entrepreneurial	  exploration	  propensities	  of	  the	  firm	  is	  to	  be	  expected	  as	  it	  routinises	  efficient	  processes	  
that	  builds	  dominant	  logic	  of	  the	  firm	  but	  also	  erects	  blinders	  (Prahalad,	  2004).	  This	  process	  demands	  a	  
fundamental	  change	  in	  logic	  and	  script	  of	  the	  firm	  that	  has	  so	  far	  mainly	  been	  pursuing	  entrepreneurial	  
exploration,	  and	  a	  firm	  has	  to	  learn	  to	  manage	  such	  crucial	  DNA	  change	  in	  its	  growth	  path	  and	  initial	  
success.	  Often	  entrepreneurs	  sell	  out	  to	  large	  companies	  without	  attempting	  that	  cathartic	  DNA	  change.	  
As	  the	  firm	  grows	  it	  has	  to	  bring	  in	  systems	  and	  processes	  that	  continually	  enhance	  efficiency,	  reduce	  
waste	  of	  trial	  and	  error	  exploration	  action.	  In	  this	  respect	  it	  also	  needs	  to	  have	  the	  efficiency	  driven	  
thinking	  in	  the	  TMT	  	  and	  perhaps	  even	  a	  change	  in	  the	  decision	  making	  structure	  or	  TMT	  structure.	  
Managing	  this	  process	  is	  therefore	  critical	  learning	  for	  the	  firm,	  and	  understanding	  this	  cross-­‐over	  point	  
is	  of	  interest	  and	  perhaps	  critical	  for	  the	  validation	  of	  the	  field	  of	  strategic	  entrepreneurship.	  It	  is	  
therefore	  proposed	  that:	  
Proposition	  1:	  	  A	  growing	  entrepreneurial	  firm	  will	  initiate	  and	  establish	  routines	  in	  its	  various	  
functions	  that	  will	  build	  its	  dominant	  logic	  internally	  with	  the	  propensity	  to	  reduce	  effectual	  
exploration.	  
With	  changes	  required	  in	  the	  operating	  ethos	  and	  the	  TMT	  thinking,	  this	  transition	  period	  for	  a	  growing	  
entrepreneurial	  firm	  is	  expected	  to	  be	  a	  phase	  of	  discontinuity,	  and	  thus	  a	  period	  of	  difficult	  changes	  
that	  would	  often	  accompany	  a	  change	  in	  decision	  maker	  composition	  of	  exploring	  effectuators	  and	  
routine	  builders.	  However,	  an	  entrepreneurial	  firm	  has	  a	  small	  TMT	  with	  the	  entrepreneur	  as	  the	  
greatest	  influence	  on	  the	  firm’s	  initial	  decision	  making.	  A	  small	  management	  team	  of	  a	  growing	  
entrepreneurial	  firm	  that	  is	  guided	  predominantly	  by	  the	  individual	  entrepreneur’s	  decisions,	  would	  
usually	  find	  it	  difficult	  to	  simultaneously	  direct	  effectual	  venturing	  and	  exploitation	  routines	  building	  
dominant	  logic.	  Therefore,	  during	  early	  phase,	  the	  entrepreneurial	  firm	  will	  alternate	  between	  the	  two	  
different	  logics.	  However,	  success	  during	  the	  growth	  phase	  of	  an	  entrepreneurial	  firm	  which	  is	  
dependent	  on	  the	  simultaneous	  pursuit	  of	  exploration	  and	  exploitation	  or	  effectual	  experimentation	  
and	  routinisation	  of	  efficient	  processes.	  Thus,	  it	  is	  proposed	  as	  follows.	  
Proposition	  2:	  	  The	  management	  of	  growth	  phase	  efficiencies	  and	  the	  longer	  term	  success	  of	  the	  
firm	  will	  depend	  upon	  how	  a	  firm	  can	  synchronise	  its	  pursuit	  of	  the	  two	  logics,	  ie,	  effectual	  
action	  in	  an	  exploration	  logic,	  and	  routinisation	  engendering	  dominant	  logic.	  
The	  above	  propositions	  require	  longitudinal	  data	  of	  firms	  through	  their	  growth	  phase	  transition	  and	  may	  
show	  how	  firms	  reconcile	  the	  fundamentally	  necessary	  but	  opposing	  aspects	  of	  growth,	  ie,	  adventurous	  
entrepreneurial	  exploration	  and	  best-­‐practice	  driven	  efficiency	  routinisation.	  	  
In	  a	  small	  firm,	  particularly	  at	  start-­‐up,	  the	  variations	  in	  cash	  flow	  turn	  out	  to	  be	  a	  large	  percentage	  of	  
the	  funds	  in	  business	  and	  hence	  impact	  the	  firm’s	  operations	  dramatically,	  and	  therefore	  the	  pain	  points	  
for	  a	  small	  firm	  are	  most	  reflected	  by	  its	  cash	  flow	  situation,	  as	  convincingly	  demonstrated	  by	  Welsh	  and	  
White	  (1981).	  Therefore,	  the	  cash	  flow	  (rather	  than	  profits)	  crisis	  points	  in	  a	  start-­‐up	  firm’s	  initial	  years	  
of	  limited	  resources	  should	  reveal	  a	  pressure	  on	  it	  to	  focus	  on	  routinisation	  rather	  than	  on	  exploration.	  
Tracking	  the	  firm’s	  focus	  on	  the	  two	  demands	  of	  routinisation	  and	  exploration	  and	  relating	  them	  to	  cash	  
flow	  crisis	  points	  should	  reveal	  the	  dynamic	  process	  of	  balancing	  between	  the	  two	  where	  routinisation	  
processes	  undertaken	  to	  achieve	  desired	  cash	  flows	  can	  support	  the	  exploration	  needed	  for	  the	  firm	  to	  
ensure	  uniqueness	  in	  its	  market	  offerings	  or	  bring	  new	  offerings	  to	  market.	  
Methodology	  
An	  exploratory	  longitudinal	  study	  is	  being	  undertaken	  in	  a	  technology	  firm	  where	  the	  effectual	  
exploration	  events	  and	  the	  routine	  establishment	  events	  are	  identified	  and	  examined.	  The	  results	  are	  
expected	  to	  enhance	  understanding	  of	  how	  a	  firm	  manages	  the	  opposing	  logic	  of	  routinising	  for	  
efficiency	  while	  keeping	  its	  exploration	  ethos	  alive	  during	  growth.	  Events	  over	  three	  years	  are	  tracked	  to	  
examine	  the	  firm	  expending	  resources	  in	  process	  efficiencies	  while	  effectuating	  new	  opportunities.	  	  
Case	  selection	  
A	  technology	  based	  firm	  was	  selected	  for	  this	  exploratory	  study.	  The	  firm	  was	  set	  up	  over	  1995	  to	  2002.	  
The	  entrepreneur	  left	  his	  salaried	  job	  taking	  a	  partner	  in	  1995,	  and	  counts	  the	  start-­‐up	  phase	  to	  have	  
extended	  to	  2002	  when	  they	  got	  their	  first	  large	  client.	  In	  the	  interim	  the	  firm	  underwent	  a	  major	  
change	  in	  their	  strategy,	  deciding	  to	  start	  product	  development,	  alternating	  between	  development	  that	  
and	  their	  more	  routinized	  consulting,	  and	  charting	  their	  growth	  path	  through	  a	  bootstrapped	  and	  rocky	  
period	  of	  over	  seven	  years.	  The	  firm	  started	  with	  consulting	  in	  data	  warehousing,	  and	  in	  the	  next	  three	  
years	  started	  product	  development.	  While	  their	  own	  data	  warehousing	  product	  did	  not	  represent	  
disruptive	  technology,	  it	  was	  sufficiently	  innovative	  in	  that	  it	  allowed	  the	  user	  to	  build	  their	  own	  data	  
marting	  solutions.	  This	  change	  from	  consulting	  to	  product	  business	  represented	  incorporation	  of	  major	  
innovation	  in	  the	  firm	  that	  was	  thus	  far	  working	  with	  routine	  consulting	  mandates.	  It	  represented	  an	  
extended	  exploration	  event	  within	  the	  routine	  events	  already	  occurring.	  Data	  on	  the	  firm’s	  working	  over	  
that	  exploration	  event	  is	  therefore	  tracked	  to	  examine	  how	  the	  firm	  coped	  with	  the	  demands	  of	  
exploration	  and	  routinisation	  and,	  in	  this	  case,	  came	  out	  successfully.	  
A	  qualitative	  case	  study	  approach	  was	  suitable	  to	  examine	  the	  ‘how’	  and	  ‘why’	  questions	  through	  
information-­‐rich	  data	  (Yin,	  2003)	  and	  was	  necessary	  to	  probe	  the	  details	  of	  the	  internal	  workings	  of	  the	  
business	  during	  the	  initial	  period	  of	  survival	  and	  growth.	  This	  particular	  case	  was	  selected	  for	  several	  
reasons	  but	  mainly	  because	  the	  firm	  faced	  the	  exploitation-­‐exploration	  tension	  in	  a	  big	  way	  early	  in	  its	  
life,	  and	  secondly	  also	  because	  the	  chief	  executive	  officer	  B	  was	  willing	  to	  give	  sufficient	  time	  for	  the	  
study	  through	  in-­‐depth	  interviewing	  and	  access	  to	  company	  archives	  and	  historical	  data.	  This	  had	  the	  
potential	  a	  strong	  case	  that	  was	  rich	  in	  information	  about	  the	  research	  issue	  or	  purpose	  (Patton,	  1990)	  
and	  providing	  ‘theoretical	  sampling’	  (Eisenhardt	  &	  Graebner,	  2007).	  A	  qualitative	  approach	  was	  
considered	  suitable	  to	  gather	  the	  rich	  information	  needed.	  
	  	  
Event	  points	  selection;	  Longitudinal	  non-­‐realtime	  design	  
The	  data	  gathering	  was	  done	  around	  the	  main	  processes	  that	  surrounded	  exploration	  events	  (product,	  
process,	  etc)	  and	  routinisation	  events.	  Exploration	  events	  identified	  in	  the	  verbal	  protocol	  were	  
characterised	  by	  everything	  the	  firm	  did	  that	  was	  aimed	  at	  attempting	  new	  initiatives,	  both	  big	  and	  
small,	  whether	  in	  process	  innovation,	  product	  R&D	  or	  customer	  relationship,	  etc.	  Routinisation	  events	  
were	  identified	  in	  the	  protocol	  by	  spotting	  all	  events	  aimed	  at	  increasing	  efficiency	  of	  operations	  and	  
marketing	  including,	  hiring	  staff,	  installing	  systems	  at	  the	  firm,	  routine	  consulting	  with	  clients,	  or	  even	  
fixing	  a	  consulting	  client’s	  system	  problem	  that	  was	  unrelated	  to	  the	  firm’s	  work	  with	  the	  client	  
company.	  The	  verbal	  protocol,	  coded	  for	  events,	  gives	  a	  clearer	  picture	  of	  the	  separation	  of	  the	  two	  
kinds	  of	  event	  data.	  These	  events	  were	  then	  tracked	  in	  time	  with	  the	  firm’s	  archival	  data	  including	  
historical	  books	  of	  accounts	  and	  email	  correspondence	  with	  the	  aim	  to	  relate	  the	  events	  to	  specific	  
financial	  situation	  the	  firm	  experienced	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  events.	  This	  enabled	  the	  pressure	  on	  the	  firm	  
to	  routinize	  for	  efficiency	  to	  be	  gauged	  at	  different	  points	  in	  time	  by	  juxtaposing	  the	  routinisation	  and	  
exploration	  events	  with	  crisis	  moments	  identified	  by	  in	  its	  cash	  flow	  changes	  over	  the	  seven	  year	  period.	  
These	  historical	  data	  gathered	  thus	  constituted	  a	  longitudinal,	  non-­‐realtime	  design	  of	  the	  study	  
empirics.	  
Data,	  results	  and	  analysis	  
The	  firm	  had	  done	  consulting	  mandates	  from	  early	  start-­‐up	  stage	  in	  1995	  to	  about	  the	  mid-­‐1997	  when	  
they	  decided	  to	  use	  their	  expertise	  for	  product	  development.	  The	  coded	  verbal	  data	  was	  combined	  with	  
the	  archival	  data	  from	  August	  1997,	  when	  the	  exploration	  event	  of	  new	  product	  development	  started,	  
to	  first	  sale	  of	  version-­‐1	  of	  the	  full	  product	  complete	  with	  the	  first	  set	  of	  manuals	  in	  early	  2000.	  To	  keep	  
it	  confidential	  the	  cash	  balance	  is	  mentioned	  divided	  by	  an	  undisclosed	  factor.	  
In	  the	  consulting	  business	  the	  entrepreneur	  and	  his	  colleagues	  knew	  from	  their	  experience	  of	  the	  local	  /	  
domestic	  market	  the	  potential	  clients	  that	  would	  have	  data	  warehousing	  needs.	  Their	  routine	  was	  
straightforward,	  ie,	  they	  would	  make	  calls	  on	  such	  companies,	  identify	  and	  define	  the	  client	  problems	  or	  
aspirations,	  negotiate	  terms	  of	  the	  mandate,	  deploy	  the	  right	  person	  for	  the	  job	  on	  site,	  and	  give	  any	  
technical	  support	  to	  the	  client	  post	  job	  execution.	  When	  there	  was	  an	  additional	  part	  in	  the	  mandate	  
beyond	  what	  was	  negotiated,	  as	  often	  happened,	  there	  would	  be	  subsidiary	  discussions	  to	  modify	  or	  
enhance	  the	  mandate	  and	  redraw	  the	  schedule.	  	  
In	  early	  1997	  the	  entrepreneur	  team	  took	  stock	  of	  their	  capabilities	  and	  their	  market	  activity,	  and	  
decided	  to	  use	  their	  skills	  and	  knowledge	  to	  develop	  the	  software	  for	  the	  potential	  data	  warehousing	  
user	  market	  (“we	  knew	  how	  to	  build	  warehouses	  from	  our	  work	  at	  (ex-­‐employer	  company)	  –	  but	  we	  
always	  thought	  there	  had	  to	  be	  a	  better	  smarter	  way.	  And	  the	  idea	  behind	  that..	  the	  better	  smarter	  way	  
was	  what	  we	  embodied	  in	  our	  software”).	  Thus	  the	  disruptions	  to	  the	  consulting	  routine	  were	  not	  
unexpected	  –	  and	  were	  anticipated	  by	  the	  entrepreneurial	  team.	  The	  sequence	  of	  events	  thereafter,	  




-­‐ Consulting	  business	  has	  been	  rising	  (from	  1995)	  
-­‐ hiring	  their	  first	  senior	  employee	  so	  the	  technical	  partner	  in	  the	  entrepreneurial	  team	  could	  
leave	  much	  of	  the	  consulting	  responsibility	  and	  devote	  himself	  to	  product	  development	  	  
-­‐ an	  early	  prototype	  version	  of	  the	  product	  idea,	  ie,	  the	  core	  of	  their	  envisaged	  product	  was	  
developed(Jan	  97)	  
-­‐ firm	  started	  using	  this	  early	  version	  in	  their	  consulting	  jobs	  and	  interested	  clients	  started	  asking	  
for	  it	  to	  use	  it	  themselves	  (Nov-­‐Dec	  97)	  
-­‐ good	  growth	  in	  consulting	  business	  (ten	  clients	  in	  Dec	  97)	  
End	  1997	  to	  end	  1998	  
-­‐ started	  looking	  for	  market	  feedback	  on	  their	  product	  idea	  from	  users/	  potential	  users	   	   	  
-­‐ went	  overseas	  to	  get	  market	  feedback	  through	  contacts	  in	  Hong	  Kong,	  US	  
-­‐ successful	  first	  meeting	  with	  mid-­‐sized	  bank	  in	  the	  US	  (May	  98)	  
-­‐ series	  of	  meetings	  over	  two	  months	  follow	  
-­‐ US	  bank	  gives	  all	  feedback	  except	  price	  it	  could	  fetch	  as	  they	  want	  to	  buy	  it:	  January	  1998;	  firm	  
refuses	  to	  sell	  as	  product	  not	  ready	  and	  ask	  for	  time	  (Sep	  98)	  
-­‐ Over	  the	  next	  few	  months	  the	  development	  work	  intensifies,	  product	  manuals	  work	  started	  
-­‐ Consulting	  clients	  eleven	  (Dec	  98)	  
January	  to	  December	  1999	  
-­‐ major	  consulting	  client	  dissatisfied	  with	  training	  on	  product	  (Jan	  99)	  
-­‐ senior	  technical	  employee	  leaves,	  partner	  CTO	  takes	  more	  consulting	  responsibility	  (Feb	  99)	  
-­‐ Entrepreneur	  CEO	  partner	  also	  makes	  new	  consulting	  calls	  (over	  January	  to	  May	  99)	  
-­‐ Charge	  consulting	  clients	  for	  the	  prototype	  version	  on	  demand	  
-­‐ Occasional	  contact	  with	  US	  bank	  (“keeping	  the	  seat	  warm”)	  
-­‐ CEO	  and	  CTO	  write	  /	  check	  new	  product	  manuals	  at	  night	  
-­‐ firm	  recruits	  more	  technical	  hands	  at	  junior	  levels	  (May-­‐Jul	  99)	  
-­‐ Engagement	  with	  US	  bank	  intensified	  with	  feedback	  cycles	  for	  product	  development;	  one	  
employee	  stationed	  in	  the	  US	  
-­‐ Product	  v-­‐1	  sold	  to	  US	  bank	  (Oct	  99)	  with	  500-­‐page	  user	  manual	  and	  1500-­‐page	  installation	  
guide.	  
The	  firm’s	  cash	  position	  changes	  through	  all	  this	  is	  juxtaposed	  with	  the	  events	  below	  in	  Figure1,	  
graphically	  showing	  the	  stress	  points	  in	  time.	  The	  net	  cash	  position	  in	  the	  business	  activity	  is	  taken.	  
	   	   	   	   	  
	   	  
	  Figure	  1:	  Firm’s	  cash	  position	  from	  start-­‐up	  through	  first	  innovation	  cycle	  to	  May	  2002	  
	  
	  
	   	   	  
	   	   	  





The	  firm	  went	  through	  a	  major	  convulsion	  in	  its	  attempt	  to	  pursue	  exploration	  between	  1997	  and	  1999	  
reflected	  in	  Figure	  1	  as	  it	  went	  through	  events	  described	  above.	  The	  following	  section	  connects	  these	  
events	  to	  what	  steps	  the	  firm	  took	  in	  order	  to	  manage	  the	  financial	  stresses	  and	  survive	  through	  a	  
strategic	  exploration	  cycle.	  	  
Concluding	  discussions	  
The	  dataset	  represents	  a	  successful	  case	  of	  strategic	  direction	  setting	  and	  a	  successful	  management	  of	  
the	  exploration-­‐routinisation	  interplay	  as	  depicted	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  in	  2006,	  apart	  from	  direct	  purchase	  
by	  companies,	  every	  singe	  one	  of	  the	  29	  major	  consulting	  clients	  was	  a	  customer	  of	  the	  proprietary	  
software	  product	  of	  the	  firm.	  The	  firm	  had	  made	  a	  successful	  transition	  to	  a	  product	  software	  firm,	  a	  
strategic	  success	  in	  its	  entrepreneurial	  start-­‐up	  stage.	  
Alongside	  an	  increasing	  client	  base	  in	  its	  consulting	  business,	  a	  slackening	  of	  debt	  collection	  in	  the	  1997-­‐
98-­‐99	  product	  development	  period	  was	  a	  direct	  cause	  of	  worsening	  cash	  situation.	  The	  average	  debtor	  
outstanding	  (of	  final	  (or	  penultimate)	  and	  major	  portion	  of	  the	  mandate	  payment	  rose	  from	  20	  days	  to	  
41	  days	  in	  October	  1998.	  This	  critical	  slippage	  reflected	  the	  failure	  of	  important	  routinisation	  effort	  at	  
start-­‐up	  that	  occurred	  at	  the	  same	  time	  as	  exploration	  focus	  increased.	  Other	  symptoms	  of	  slackening	  of	  
effort	  in	  building	  efficient	  routines	  were	  found	  in	  records	  of	  consultants	  attending	  to	  ordinary	  machine	  
problems	  in	  individual	  members’	  computers	  at	  client	  site	  that	  were	  outside	  the	  firm’s	  mandates	  with	  
the	  client.	  While	  these	  were	  done	  as	  a	  goodwill	  gesture,	  they	  reflected	  a	  lack	  of	  attempt	  to	  develop	  
routines	  like	  periodic	  time	  and	  cost	  sheets	  to	  control	  consulting	  mandate	  budgeting.	  An	  attempt	  to	  
rectify	  this	  is	  seen	  in	  the	  hiring	  of	  office	  administrator	  in	  March	  1999	  and	  the	  introduction	  of	  budget	  
reporting.	  














$	  1.2	  mn	  
$	  -­‐	  0.5	  mn	  
All	  the	  personnel	  in	  the	  firm,	  except	  the	  office	  administrator,	  were	  technical	  personnel.	  The	  exploration-­‐
routinisation	  tension	  was	  apparent	  not	  only	  in	  their	  lack	  of	  discipline	  in	  the	  routine	  aspects	  of	  their	  work	  
but	  also	  in	  their	  unquestioned	  tendency	  to	  do	  the	  product	  development	  as	  against	  consulting	  (“all	  of	  us	  
find	  development	  work	  technically	  challenging	  and	  exciting”).	  Appreciation	  of	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  
routine	  aspect	  of	  the	  business	  is	  reflected	  in	  the	  entrepreneur’s	  own	  words	  that	  consulting	  was	  a	  
“poisoned	  chalice”	  as	  the	  firm	  decided	  to	  self	  fund	  all	  development	  work.	  They	  realised	  this	  meant	  
keeping	  up	  a	  strong	  consulting	  dealflow.	  With	  the	  limited	  technical	  hands	  in	  the	  small	  firm,	  the	  drive	  to	  
pick	  back	  the	  high	  calibre	  consulting	  deliverables	  through	  the	  first	  half	  of	  most	  of	  1999	  when	  the	  firm	  
neglected	  the	  product	  development	  work	  it	  started	  with	  the	  prospective	  client,	  as	  in	  Proposition	  1,	  at	  a	  
high	  risk.	  According	  to	  the	  entrepreneur	  “We	  kept	  the	  seat	  warm”;	  however	  the	  US	  bank	  “was	  hardly	  
waiting	  with	  bated	  breath….	  And	  we	  feared	  we	  would	  lose	  them”.	  
While	  consulting	  has	  funded	  their	  product	  development,	  the	  firm	  has	  thus	  managed	  to	  blend	  the	  
routine	  and	  exploration	  aspects	  of	  their	  business.	  This	  is	  most	  evident	  in	  their	  using	  their	  product	  
development	  prototype	  in	  their	  consulting	  mandates,	  as	  much	  as	  in	  their	  decision	  to	  fund	  their	  product	  
development	  through	  consulting	  income.	  The	  management	  of	  exploration-­‐routinisation	  tension	  was	  also	  
evident	  in	  their	  not	  agreeing	  to	  ‘white-­‐label’	  their	  product	  even	  sacrificing	  short	  term	  revenue	  for	  long	  
term	  brand	  development,	  and	  also	  in	  their	  decision	  to	  develop	  the	  product	  with	  the	  potential	  client’s	  
feedback	  over	  a	  year.	  Even	  after	  the	  technical	  aspects	  of	  the	  product	  along	  with	  attendant	  
documentation	  of	  manuals	  and	  guides	  had	  settled,	  the	  market	  routine	  of	  price-­‐point	  discovery	  would	  
take	  several	  years	  alongside	  future	  version	  updates	  of	  the	  product.	  The	  discipline	  of	  the	  market	  making	  
routines	  was	  learnt	  over	  time	  as	  seen	  in	  the	  entrepreneur’s	  remark:	  “We	  sold	  our	  first	  version	  very	  low	  –	  
it	  was	  part	  of	  development.	  We	  did	  not	  know	  what	  we	  had.	  I	  feel	  we	  have	  only	  now	  made	  the	  price-­‐
point	  discovery	  journey”.	  This	  was	  in	  2006.	  
By	  forging	  a	  close	  relationship	  between	  the	  routinisation	  needs	  of	  the	  consulting	  business	  and	  the	  
product	  development	  exploration	  the	  firm	  ensured	  entrepreneurial	  survival	  as	  well	  as	  charted	  its	  growth	  
strategy,	  as	  suggested	  in	  Proposition	  2.	  In	  this	  case	  they	  evolved	  a	  co-­‐dependent	  logic	  between	  
efficiency	  routinisation	  and	  effectual	  exploration	  at	  start-­‐up.	  Recognising	  consulting	  as	  “the	  poisoned	  
chalice”	  helped	  in	  awareness	  and	  resistance	  to	  establishing	  a	  dominant	  logic	  with	  blinders	  in	  routine	  
consulting.	  By	  ensuring	  the	  ability	  to	  fund,	  through	  consulting	  mandates,	  the	  effectual	  exploration	  of	  
product	  development	  with	  the	  potential	  client’s	  feedback	  the	  firm	  developed	  the	  discipline	  of	  efficient	  
routines.	  
Implications,	  limitations,	  further	  research	  
The	  successful	  management	  of	  the	  exploration-­‐routinisation	  tension	  at	  start-­‐up	  throws	  up	  several	  
pointers	  to	  how	  the	  firm	  can	  manage	  the	  ‘phase-­‐change’	  as	  it	  grows	  into	  a	  large	  company	  where,	  on	  the	  
one	  hand,	  establishing	  efficiency	  routines	  are	  critical	  for	  growth	  and,	  on	  the	  other,	  exploration	  of	  new	  
direction	  critical	  in	  the	  long	  term.	  
A	  single	  case	  in	  this	  study	  is	  its	  major	  limitation.	  However	  the	  data	  in	  this	  study,	  itself	  an	  exploratory	  
enquiry,	  examines	  a	  start-­‐up	  entrepreneurial	  firm	  at	  the	  micro	  level	  and	  extends	  understanding	  of	  the	  
black	  box	  of	  entrepreneurial	  firm	  growth	  dynamic.	  Two	  other	  cases	  are	  presently	  at	  the	  final	  stages	  of	  
data	  collection	  and	  are	  expected	  to	  strengthen	  the	  study.	  Studies	  with	  larger	  micro	  data	  are	  definitely	  
needed.	  
Several	  entrepreneurial	  firms	  do	  not	  make	  the	  transition	  across	  this	  “phase	  change”	  barrier	  well.	  
Longitudinal	  data	  in	  the	  study	  indicate	  how	  the	  stages	  of	  effectual	  action	  and	  emergence	  of	  dominant	  
logic	  occur	  during	  initial	  growth.	  How	  a	  firm’s	  small	  team	  can	  manage	  entrepreneurial	  action	  and	  
consolidation	  of	  strategic	  direction	  needed	  for	  successful	  growth	  as	  ‘strategic	  entrepreneurship’	  
recommends,	  may	  help	  clarify	  the	  theoretical	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  field	  of	  ‘strategic	  entrepreneurship’.	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